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There are two unresolved puzzles in the empirical foreign exchange literature.  The first 
is the finding that tests of forward rate unbiasedness using the forward rate and forward 
premium equations yield markedly different conclusions.  A companion puzzle—the 
forward premium puzzle—is the fact that the forward premium incorrectly predicts the 
direction of the subsequent change in the spot rate, which implies a massive rejection of 
uncovered interest parity.  This paper resolves both puzzles. 
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 1. Introduction 
There are two unresolved empirical puzzles in the foreign exchange literature.  
The first puzzle arises when unbiasedness is tested using what McCallum (1994) calls the 
forward rate and forward premium equations.  If the forward rate is an unbiased predictor 
of the future spot rate, the estimated slope coefficient should be insignificantly different 
from 1.0 for either specification.  The puzzle arises because estimates of the slope 
coefficient from the forward rate specification are frequently close to, and sometimes 
insignificantly different from 1.0, while the estimates of the slope coefficient from the 
forward premium specification are frequently negative and nearly always significantly 
different from 1.0.  The second puzzle, known as the forward premium puzzle, is the fact 
that the forward premium incorrectly predicts the direction of the subsequent change in 
the spot rate.  Both puzzles have been investigated extensively. 
This paper resolves both puzzles.  The unbiasedness puzzle is resolved by 
showing that while the estimated slope coefficients from the forward rate and forward 
premium specifications are identical under the null hypothesis, they are not even 
comparable under the alternative.  Hence, the fact that the estimates from the two 
specifications are very different is a consequence of the fact that, for a variety of reasons, 
unbiasedness does not hold perfectly.  The noncomparability of the estimates from these 
alternative specifications also means that contrary to the suggestion in the literature, 
unbiasedness cannot be tested using the forward premium equation.  This is consequence 
of the fact that comparable estimates of the slope coefficient do not exist under both the 
null and alternative hypotheses.  The noncomparability estimates from these equations is 
invariant to whether exchange rates are I(0) or I(1) processes.  Monte Carlo experiments 
  1show that even tiny violations of unbiasedness can result in dramatically different 
estimates of the slope coefficient from the forward premium equation. 
The resolution of the forward premium puzzle is a consequence of the near-
random-walk behavior of exchange rates.  Specifically, the near-random-walk behavior 
of the spot rate implies that there should be a weak and perhaps statistically insignificant 
relationship between changes in the spot rate and the forward premium.  The negative 
relationship often reported in the literature is due to the strong positive correlation 
between the forward premium and the difference between the domestic and foreign 
interest rates, which is a consequence of covered interest parity (CIP), and the correlation 
between the change in the spot rate and the difference between the domestic and foreign 
interest rates.  The latter correlation, which is sometimes positive and other times 
negative, is driven by economic fundamentals.  Specifically, the correlation is negative 
when increases in the interest rate differential are due to expectations of higher domestic 
inflation relative to foreign inflation and positive when the behavior of the interest rate 
differential is due to changes in relative real interest rates.  The estimates tend to be 
negative on average for many countries because, more often than not, the interest rate 
differential is driven by changes in expectations of relative inflation rates. 
This resolution of the forward premium puzzle is shown to be consistent with the 
observed exchange rate data over different sample periods and a variety of exchange 
rates.  Moreover, it accounts for a remarkably large proportion of the time variation in the 
estimates of the slope parameter from the forward premium equation. 
The idea that the forward premium puzzle is due to expectations not being 
rational has its roots with Meese and Rogoff (1983), who showed that forecasts of the 
  2exchange rate based on structural economic models were no better than random walk 
forecasts.  Indeed, evidence that economic models can consistently outperform the simple 
random walk model remains elusive (e.g., Clarida, Sarno, Taylor, and Valente, 2003; 
Cheung, Chinn, and Pascual, 2005; Groen, 2005; Kilian and Taylor, 2003; and Rossi, 
2006).  Recent research has focused on the coexistence of economic fundamentals with 
the random walk behavior of exchange rates.  For example, Engel and West (2005) show 
that “near” random walk behavior arises in a rational expectations present-value model if 
one of the economic fundamentals is nonstationary and the discount factor is 
“sufficiently” close to 1.0.  Also, building on Frankel’s (1976) argument that economic 
fundamentals are detached from exchange rates because of swings in expectations about 
the future exchange rate, Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2004, 2006) show that the 
apparent disconnect between economic fundamentals and exchange rates can arise if 
market participants regularly change the weight that they give to various economic 
fundamentals—a behavior confirmed by Cheung and Chinn’s (2001) survey of U.S. 
foreign-exchange traders.  Careful empirical work by Sarno and Valente (2006) suggests 
that such behavior can account for the observed behavior of some exchange rates.  My 
resolution of the forward premium puzzle is in the spirit of this literature. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into six sections.  Section 2 presents the 
unbiasedness hypothesis and discusses the forward rate and forward premium tests for 
unbiasedness.  Section 3 demonstrates the noncomparability of estimates of the slope 
coefficient from the forward rate and forward premium equations.  The qualitative 
importance of the noncomparability of the estimates of the slope coefficient from the 
forward rate and forward premium equations for trivial violations of the unbiasedness 
  3condition is examined in Section 4.  Section 5 derives the forward premium equation 
used to test UIP.  Section 6 presents a resolution of the forward premium puzzle based on 
near-random-walk behavior of exchange rates, CIP, and economic fundamentals.  Section 
7 concludes. 
2. Tests of Unbiasedness 
Unbiasedness of the forward exchange rate implies that 
(1)  ,  11 tt t Es f −− =
where   denotes the log of the spot exchange rate expressed in terms of the home 
currency; 
t s
t f  denotes the log of the 1-period-ahead forward exchange rate—the home-
currency price of foreign exchange to be paid for and delivered in period t; and   
denotes the expectation conditional on all information available before   and 
1 t E −
t s t f  are 
determined. 
Because   is unobservable, unbiasedness is most frequently tested under the 
assumption of rational expectations, i.e., 
1 tt Es −
(2)  ,  1 tt t sE sv − =+ t
where   is an i.i.d. random variable,  t v
2 (0, ) t f ν ν σ ∼ , that is independent of information 
available at period  .  Substituting (1) into (2) yields  1 t −
(3)  .  1 tt sf v − =+ t
t
Hodrick (1987) notes that (3) motivated researchers to test the unbiasedness proposition 
by estimating 
(4)  1 tt sf α βν − =+ + 
  4and testing the hypothesis that  0 α =  and  1 β = .  In practice, however, only the 
hypothesis  1 β =  is of concern (McCallum, 1994).  Early investigations of forward rate 
unbiasedness (e.g., Frenkel, 1976, 1981; and Levich, 1978) relied on (4). 
Following Meese and Singleton’s (1982) evidence that foreign exchange rates are 
nonstationary, it has been common (indeed, nearly universal) to test the unbiasedness by 
estimating  
(5)  11 () tt t sf s t α βω −− Δ=+ − +  
and testing the hypothesis  0 α =  and  1 β = .
1  Longworth (1981) was one of the first to 
test foreign exchange market efficiency using (5) and McCallum (1994) observes that 
tests of unbiasedness using (5) are “too numerous to mention.”  The preference for (5) 
over (4) stems from the apparent nonstationarity of exchange rates and the well-known 
fact that (4) and (5) are equivalent under the null hypothesis. 
While it has been recognized for some time that estimates from the forward rate 
and forward premium equations are not identical when the maintained hypothesis is false 
(e.g., McCallum, 1994; Goodhart, McMahon, and Ngama, 1997; Sarno and Taylor, 2002; 
and Maynard, 2003), essentially unnoticed is the fact that the estimated slope coefficients 
from (4) and (5) are not comparable under the alternative hypothesis.
2  Indeed, 
                                                 
1 Meese and Singleton (1982) suggested that testing the unbiasedness proposition using (4) “may be 
inappropriate, since the asymptotic distribution theory employed may not be valid” and suggested that (5) 
provided a better way to test the unbiasedness of the forward rate.  Hodrick (1987, p. 30) provided support 
for this conclusion by demonstrating how (4) may generate estimates “supportive of the null 
hypothesis…even though it can be strongly rejected in specifications that use data in a form more likely to 
satisfy the assumption of time series stationarity.”  Specifically, if 
t s  and 
t f  are integrated order one, i.e., 
I(1), but cointegrated with a cointegrating vector (1, -1), estimates of β  from (4) will be 1 regardless of the 
true value of β . 
 
2 The exception is McCallum (1994, p. 118), who notes that the “unconditional growth rate implications” 
from these two equations “are quite distinct when  1.0 β ≠ ,” i.e., when the null hypothesis does not hold. 
  5considerable effort has been devoted to explaining why the estimates are so different 
(e.g., Hodrick, 1987; McCallum, 1994; Goodhart, McMahon, and Ngama, 1997; 
Barnhart, McNown, and Wallace, 1999; Maynard and Phillips, 2001; and Maynard, 
2003). 
3. The Noncomparability of Forward Rate and Forward Premium Tests of 
Unbiasedness 
 
To see that estimates of β  from (4) and (5) are not comparable when the null 
hypothesis does not hold, note that (4) is obtained after a normalization has been 
imposed.  This is seen more clearly by considering the unnormalized version of (4), i.e., 
(6) 
**
1 tt sf t λ αβ ε − =+ + . 
The normalization determines both the unit of measure and the direction of the 
minimization of the sum of squares.
3  To see this, note that (6) can be rewritten as 
(7) 
**
1 /( / ) / tt sf t α λβ λ ε − =+ + λ . 
In the case of single-equation ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, it is common 
practice to impose the normalization before (7) is estimated.  The most convenient, and, 
hence, most commonly used, normalization is  1 λ = .  With this normalization, (7) is (4).  
Moreover, with this normalization,  / tt ν ελ =  is the distance from an orthogonal 
projection of   onto the space spanned by  t s 1 t f − . 
Of course, the same analysis can be applied to (5).  That is, before normalizing, 
(5) can be written as 
(8) 
** **
11 () ( ) tt t t ss f s 1 t θ αβ −− −= + −+ ϑ −
                                                
. 
As before, (8) can be normalized and rewritten as 
 
3 See Chow (1964) for a detailed analysis. 
  6(9) 
** **
11 () / ( / ) ( ) tt t t t ss f s 1 / α θβθ ϑ −− −= + −+ θ − , 
which, under the normalization that  1 θ = , can be re-parameterized as 
(10)  11 () ( ) tt t t ss f s 1 t α βω −− − ′′ ′′ −= + −+ . 
This establishes that the unit of measure of  t ω  is the distance from an orthogonal 
projection of   onto  1 tt ss − − 11 tt f s −− − . 
Note that (10) is identical to (5) except that β′′ replaces β  to emphasize the fact 
that the slope coefficients in (4) and (5) may be different.  Indeed, they will be the same if 
and only if 
** * // β λβθ = .  This will occur if 
** * β β =  and λ θ = .  At any point in the 
parameter space other than  1 β β′′ == , not only are the estimates of β  from (4) and (5) 
different, they are not comparable; they have different units of measure,  tt v ω ≠ .
4 
Despite the fact that (5) is routinely used to test the unbiasedness proposition, the 
noncomparability of the slope coefficient from (4) and (5) means that unbiasedness 
cannot be tested using (5), owing to the fact that estimates of β —equivalent to those 
from (4)—do not exist under the alternative hypothesis.  Estimates of β  from (5) are 
equivalent to (4) under the null hypothesis, but not even comparable under the 
alternative.  Hence, in contrast to the assertion that (5) is a better way of testing 
unbiasedness than (4), the fact is unbiasedness cannot be tested using (5).  This is true 
regardless of whether the spot and forward rates are I(0) or I(1) processes.  The 
suggestion that (5) provides a more appropriate test of the unbiasedness hypothesis than 
(4) is simply wrong. 
                                                 
4 To see how this problem arose in the short-run demand for money literature, see Thornton (1985). 
  7The noncomparability of (4) and (5) explains why the estimates from these 
specifications can be so different.  Indeed, because of the general noncomparability of 
estimates of β  from (4) and (5), there is no particular reason to be distressed by the fact 
that estimates from these equations are different.  The unbiasedness puzzle is resolved by 
noting that there are good reasons to expect unbiasedness to be violated, at least to some 
extent.  For example, unbiasedness will not hold if investors are risk averse because then 
a non-zero risk premium drives a wedge between  1 t f −  and  .  Alternatively, 
unbiasedness may be violated because of Jensen’s inequality, or what is known in the 
foreign exchange literature as Siegel’s paradox.  While there is disagreement about the 
magnitude of the distortion caused by Jensen’s inequality (e.g., McCulloch, 1975; Siegel, 
1972; Goodhart, McMahon, and Ngama, 1997; and Dumas, Jennergren, and Naslund, 
1995), there is no doubt that the existence of this mathematical fact prevents 
unbiasedness from holding exactly.  As we are about to see, even a tiny violation of the 
unbiasedness hypothesis has significant consequences for the estimated slope coefficient 
from (5). 
1 tt Es −
4. The Qualitative Importance of Non-comparability 
The above analysis shows that estimates of the slope coefficients from (4) and (5) 
are not comparable.  This section investigates how different these estimates can be for 
even a tiny violation of (1).  To this end, a simple Monte Carlo experiment is conducted.  





tt t ss μ ρξ − =+ + 1 ,  ρ <  and 
2 (0, ) t N ξ ξ σ ∼ .  The hypothetical forward rate is given by 
11 [( )
hh
tt ] t f s λμ ρ θ −− =+ + , where 
2 (0, ) t N θ θ σ ∼ .  Note that (1) holds if  1 λ =  and  0 t θ =  
  8for all t.  If  1 λ =  and  0 t θ ≠ , (1) does not hold at every point in time, but holds on 
average, i.e.,  .  This is the type of violation that one might expect to be 
associated with Jensen’s inequality.  Finally, if 
1
h
t Ef E s − =
h
t
1 λ ≠ , the forward rate is biased even 
unconditionally, e.g., a risk premium or a peso problem. 
Two parameterizations of the model are considered.  The first assumes that 
exchange rates are stationary; the second assumes they are nonstationary.  The 
parameters are chosen to match monthly data for the Swiss spot rate against the U.S. 
dollar for the period December 1978 – December 1998.
5  Specifically,  0.48 μ = , 
0.98 ρ = , and  0.03 ξ σ = .  The initial condition is the log of the Swiss exchange rate for 
December 1978, i.e.,  .  For each case considered, 10,000 samples with a 






t f −  after discarding the first 1,000 
observations to lessen the effect of the initial condition.  The sample size is similar to 
many empirical studies that use monthly data. 
The distributions of the estimates of the slope coefficients from (4) and (5) under 
the null hypothesis, i.e., for  1 λ =  and  0 t θ =  for all t are presented in panels (a) and (b), 
respectively, of Figure 1.  The estimates from both equations are centered on the true 
value of 1.0.  The distribution of estimates from (4) are very tight, ranging from 0.9997 to 
1.0003. 
The distribution of the estimates from (5) is much wider and strongly skewed to 
the right.  The positive skew reflects the finite sample bias caused by the extreme 
                                                 
5 The choice of the Swiss spot rate is arbitrary.  The results are qualitatively the same regardless of the spot 
rate chosen. 
  9persistence in the spot rate.  This bias was first documented by Bekaert, Hodrick, and 
Marshall (1997) and disappears—albeit very slowly—as the sample size increases.
6
 
To investigate what happens to the estimates from (4) and (5) when (1) does not 
hold, market participants are assumed to be aware that the spot rate is generated by an 
AR(1) process but are uncertain about the magnitude of ρ .  Specifically, the true 
coefficient is  t ρ θ + , but market participants believe it is ρ .  The departure from the null 
hypothesis is very small.  Specifically,  0.001 θ σ = .  The distributions of the estimates of 
the slope coefficients from (4) and (5) are presented in Figure 2, in panels (a) and (b), 
respectively.  Given the modest violation of the null hypothesis, it is not surprising that 
the distribution of estimates from (4) in panel (a) is nearly identical to the distribution in 
panel (a) of Figure 1.  The violation of (1) has an enormous impact on the estimates from 
(5), however.  The estimates are relatively small.  The mean estimate is 0.0155 and 
negative estimates are common.  None of the negative estimates is as large as those 
frequently obtained in the literature, however.  
The second parameterization assumes that exchange rates are nonstationary, i.e., 
1 ρ = .  All other parameters are unchanged.  Estimates of (4) and (5) under the null are 
presented in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3.  Estimates of β  from (4) are very tightly 
clustered around 1.0 because of the well-known fact that the estimates are super 
consistent in this circumstance.  The estimates from (5) are also tightly centered about 1.0 
and are symmetric. 
Now consider estimates of β  from (4) and (5) under the assumption that  1 λ =  
and 0.001 θ σ = , which are presented in Figure 4.  Estimates of β  from (4), shown in 
                                                 
6 The distribution remained slightly skewed for a sample size of 2,500 observations. 
  10panel (a), are essentially the same as those reported in Figure 3.  As is the case with the 
assumption of stationarity, estimates of β  from (5) are very different.  All of the 
estimates are positive, but considerably less than 1.0.
7
 
Additional experiments were conducted letting λ  equal 0.95 and 1.05, 
respectively, and using values of  θ σ  ranging from 0.1 to 0.00001.  The results are 
summarized here to conserve space.  As might be expected, estimates of β  from (4) are 
rather tightly distributed about the expected value, which is slightly greater than 1.0 when 
1 λ <  and slightly less than 1.0 when  1 λ > , and the variance of the distributions declines 
as  θ σ  is decreased from 0.1.  Estimates from (5) continue to be close to zero, but are 
consistently negative when  1 λ <  and consistently positive when  1 λ > .  The shape of the 
distribution is relatively insensitive to the choice of  θ σ . 
These experiments demonstrate that, because of the non-comparability of the 
estimates from (4) and (5) when the null hypothesis does not hold, even relatively modest 
violations of the null hypothesis can generate very different parameter estimates from the 
two specifications.  It is important to remember that the results in Figures 2 and 4 were 
for specific data-generating processes for the spot and forward rates.  The results obtained 
for historical data depend on the true, but unknown, data-generating processes.  Indeed, 
using a simple model economy Chakraborty (2007) has shown that small violations of the 
                                                 
7 An interesting question is how close 
2
ν σ  has to be to zero before non-comparability is not a significant 
issue (assuming  1 λ = ).  Experiments suggest that when   the distribution of estimates from (5) 
looks more like the distribution in Figure 1, panel b, except that distribution is shifted further to the left, 
resulting in a much higher probability of a negative estimate.  When  , there is essentially no 





  11unbiasedness condition can result in relatively large negative estimates of β , more 
typical of those found in the literature. 
5. The Test for UIP 
The forward premium equation is also used to test for UIP.  To better understand 
the implication of the analyses in Sections 3 and 4 for tests of UIP, it is useful to see how 
the forward premium test for UIP is derived.  UIP requires 
(11) 
*
11 1 1 tt t t t t iiE s s 1 ζ −− − − − −= −+ , 
where   and   are the domestic and foreign interest rates denominated in the domestic 
and foreign currencies, respectively, on assets that are identical and have the same 




1 t ζ − , potentially reflects a 
variety of factors including time aggregation and a risk premium. 
UIP states that expected gain from holding one currency rather than another must 
be equal to the opportunity cost of holding that currency rather than the other, which is 
just the nominal interest rate differential.  UIP is essentially an arbitrage condition.  When 
(11) does not hold investors have an expected profit opportunity. 
Of course, there is also a riskless arbitrage opportunity, CIP, which states that 
(12) 
*
11 1 1 tt t t t ii fs 1 ν −− − − − −= −+, 
where  1 t ν −  is an i.i.d. zero mean, constant variance random variable that reflects the fact 
that CIP will not hold identically because of transactions costs, measurement error, etc. 
8 
Substituting (12) into (11) yields 
(13)  11 1 1 1 tt t t t tt fsE s s 1 ζ ν −− − − − −= −+− −
                                                
. 
 
8 It is more common practice in the literature to present (12) without an error.  However, there is no 
evidence that CIP holds without error. 
  12The forward premium test for UIP is obtained by assuming (2), i.e., rational expectations.  
With (2), (13) can be rewritten as 
(14)  11 tt t t sf s 1 η −− Δ= − +−
1 t
,  
where  11 tt ηζν −− =− −
1 t
, which is parameterized to yield the forward premium test for UIP, 
i.e., 
(15)  11 () tt t sf s α βη −− ′′ Δ= + − +− . 
Note that the forward premium test of UIP does not assume unbiasedness: (1) is 
not used to derive (15); (11), (12), and (2) are required, but (1) is not.  Hence, despite the 
fact that (15) and (5) are observationally equivalent, the forward premium tests for 
unbiasedness and UIP are conceptually separate and distinct.
9 
6. The Forward Premium Puzzle 
Considerable resources have been devoted to “resolving” the forward premium 
puzzle—the fact that estimates of β  from (15) are typically negative.  Some of this 
literature focuses on the failure of UIP itself by arguing that the forward premium 
includes a time-varying risk premium.  However, the majority of this work suggests that a 
time-varying risk premium cannot account for the massive rejection of UIP found in the 
literature.  Hence, the violations of UIP found in the literature are generally attributed to 
something other than a failure of UIP per se. 
Even though (1) is not used to derive (15), unbiasedness and UIP are closely 
linked.  To see just how closely linked they are, note that substituting (1) into (11) yields 
(16) 
*
11 1 1 tt t t t ii fs 1 ζ −− − − − −= −+ , 
                                                 
9 McCallum (1994, p. 108-09) also notes that there is a distinction between these hypotheses. 
  13which is observationally equivalent to (12).  Consequently, if one assumes that 
unbiasedness holds, it would be extremely difficult to distinguish between CIP and 
UIP.
10  In light of the overwhelming evidence that CIP holds, a rejection of UIP is 
tantamount to a rejection of unbiasedness.  Moreover, we have already seen, small 
violations of the unbiasedness condition can result in negative estimates of β —a result
common in the 
 
UIP literature. 
Despite Chakraborty’s (2007) demonstration that small violations of the 
unbiasedness condition can result in estimates of β  that are somewhat characteristic of 
those found in the literature, this section explores an alternative resolution of the forward 
premium puzzle.  Specifically, it argues that the forward premium puzzle is due to the 
interaction of the near-random-walk behavior of exchange rates, the fact that CIP holds, 
and economic fundamentals that drive the behavior of exchange rates.  
6.1 Random Walk Behavior and the Failure of Rational Expectations 
It is useful to note that the “rational expectations” assumption used to derive (15) 
is very strong.  One might think of (2) might be thought of as stochastic perfect foresight, 
with foresight being perfect if  0 t v =  for all t.  The effect of (2) is to replace the 
unobservable variable,  , with the observed variable,  .  The conflict between the 
near-random-walk behavior of exchange rates and (2) can best be demonstrated by 
assuming that the spot rate is a pure random walk, i.e., 
1 tt Es − t s
(17)  1 tt ss t υ − =+ . 
With this assumption,   and not  1 tt t Es s − = 1 − t t sv + , as in (2).  If in addition to the random 
walk assumption, it is assumed that unbiasedness holds, then  11 tt t 1 t f Es s − −− = =  for all t 
                                                 
10 A distinction could only be made on the basis of the characteristics of the error term. 
  14and  .  The relationships among  1 tt sf s − −= Δ t t s Δ ,  1 tt 1 f s − − − , and  1 tt sf − −  are very 
different from the relationship if the rational expectations assumption (2) used to derive 
(15) holds.  In this case, the  1 tt t t Es s v − = − .  Under unbiasedness,  1 tt t f sv − = + , so that 
.  Conceptually, if the rational expectations assumption (2) held, the white 
noise errors made in forecasting the spot rate,  , would be uncorrelated with shocks to 
the spot rate, 
1 tt sf v − −= t
t v
t υ .  However, if the spot rate was essentially unpredictable, as in the case of 
a near random walk stochastic process,  t v t υ ≅ , and the correlation would be close to 1.0.  
Note too that  11 tt t t f ss −− −= Δ + v , and, hence, highly correlated with  t s Δ . 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of  11 tt f s − − − ,  1 tt sf − − , and   for nine 




BF , Italian lira, IL, French franc,  , Dutch guilder,  , and German 
mark,  .  The data are end-of-month foreign currency/U.S. dollar spot and forward 
exchange rates.  For the first four currencies listed, the data are for the period December 
1978 – January 2002.  For the last five currencies, the data are for the period December 
1978 – December 1998.
FF DG
DM
11  Consistent with the evidence that exchange rates are near-
random-walk processes, the descriptive statistics for  1 tt sf − −  and  t s Δ  are very similar.  
Indeed, the correlation between  1 tt sf − −  and  t s Δ , presented in the second to last line of 
Table 1, is greater than 0.99 for every currency and the ratio of the variance of   to 
 is very close to 1 for all of the currencies.   
t s Δ
1 tt sf − −
For all nine currencies, the maximum and minimum values of the forward 
premium are much smaller in absolute value than either  1 tt sf − −  or  t s Δ .  Moreover, the 
                                                 
11 These data were used in Baillie and Kilic (2006) and were kindly provided by Rehim Kilic. 
  15ratio of the variance of   to the forward premium is very large for all currencies, 
ranging from 30 for the CD to 225 for the ¥, with most being larger than 80.  Moreover, 
the time-series properties of 
t s Δ
1 tt 1 f s −− −  differ significantly from those of either  1 tt sf − −  or 
.  Hence, the data are very similar to what is expected if the spot rate is a random 
walk process and very different from what is expected if (2) held and the forward rate 
was an unbiased predictor of the spot rate. 
t s Δ
The near random walk behavior of exchange rates is important for resolving the 
UIP puzzle.  Specifically, if the spot rate were a pure random walk, estimates of β  from 
(15) would be zero.  Both  1 t f −  and  1 t s −  would reflect all of the information available at 
 and   would reflect the new information, orthogonal to the information in either  1 t − t s Δ
1 t f −  or  .  Estimates of  1 t s − β  are typically not zero, however, and are sometimes 
statistically significant.  This is shown in Table 2, which presents the estimates of (15) for 
each of the nine exchange rates over their respective sample periods.  The table reports 
the OLS estimates α  and β , the corresponding marginal significance level (s.l.), and the 
adjusted R-square (
2 R ).  The estimates are negative for all but two exchanges rates—  
and 
FF
IL.  However, estimates of 
2 R  are very small, indicating a weak relationship 
between   and  t s Δ 11 ( tt ) f s −− − .  Given the relative variances of the right- and left-hand 
sides of (15), reported in Table 1, it is hardly surprising that the estimated 
2 R  are 
typically small or that estimates of β  tend to be imprecisely estimated—the estimate of 
β  is not significantly different from zero at conventional critical values for four of the 
nine currencies. 
  16The weakness of the relationship between  t s Δ  and the forward premium is 
dramatically illustrated in Figure 5, which plots  t s Δ  (on the vertical axis) and the forward 
premium (on the horizontal axis) using the same scale.  The 45-degree line indicates 
where all of the observations would lie if UIP held without error.  Virtually no 
observations lie on or about the line. 
Moreover, there is virtually no time variation in these figures.  Hence, recent 
evidence that UIP fairs better when asymmetries and nonlinearities between the spot and 
forward rate are accounted for, when the forward premium is at a premium rather than a 
discount, or during the first half of the 1980s (e.g., Wu and Zhang, 1996; Bansal, 1997; 
Bansal and Dahlquist, 2000; Zhou, 2002; Sarno, Valente, and Leon, 2006; and Baillie and 
Kilic, 2006) is likely to be fragile. 
The fragility of the estimates of β  is investigated further by estimating (15) using 
rolling regression with a 30-month window.  These rolling regression estimates of β  for 
each of the nine currencies are presented in Figures 6 and 7.  The estimates are plotted on 
the last month of the corresponding sample.  Estimates for the ¥ and the European 
currencies other than the pound are presented in Figure 6 because they behave similarly.  
Estimates for the CD and the £ are presented in Figure 7.  Consistent with the results in 
Table 1, the estimates tend to be negative on average; however, they vary considerably 
over time, switching from negative to positive, sometimes rather quickly.  Moreover, the 
estimates in Figure 6 behave similarly over time despite marked differences in the 
behavior of the forward premiums for some of these exchange rates. 
What accounts for these results presented in Figures 6 and 7?  The answer can be 
better understood by noting that the estimate of β  is given by 




























where the bar notes that the variables have been mean adjusted.  Both the numerator and 
denominator of (18) tend to be small, but the denominator, which is the variance of the 
forward premium, is very small.  Moreover, for all nine currencies, the denominator is 
much more stable over time than the numerator, which varies considerably over time, 
switching from negative to positive.  Because the denominator is very small, relatively 
large changes in the numerator sometimes lead to very large positive or negative 
estimates of β . 
The resolution of the forward premium puzzle comes from observing that while 
 and  t s Δ 1 tt 1 f s − − −
1 − 1 −
1
 are nearly uncorrelated with each other, both are correlated with 
.  This is shown in Table 3, which presents the correlation between   and 
*
1 tt ii − −
*
1 tt ii − −
1 tt f s − − −
1 − 1
 and   for each of the nine currencies.  One-month rates were not available 
for most of these countries over this time period.  Hence, the foreign rates are 3-month 
rates or longer obtained from the IMF.
t s Δ
12  The U.S. rate is the secondary market rate on 3-
month T-bills obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.  The 
positive correlation between   and 
*
1 tt ii − − 1 tt f s − − −  for all currencies is a consequence of 
CIP.  Indeed, if the maturity of interest rates matched that of the forward contracts and 
the observations were synchronous, the correlations would be very close to 1.0.  The 
                                                 
12 For Canada, France, Germany, Belgium, the U.K., and Japan, the rates are 3-month rates, on Treasury 
bills (Canada, France, the U.K., and Belgium), Interbank deposits (Germany), and time deposits (Japan).  
For Italy, the rate is the 3- to 12-month newly issued T-bills.  For the Netherlands, it is the banker’s call 
loan rate.  For Switzerland, it is rate on federal debt register claims. 
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*
1 tt ii −− 1 −  is much lower and is negative for every currency 
except the Italian lira, which is slightly positive. 
Estimates of β  are determined by the relationship of 
*
1 tt ii 1 − − −  with both  11 tt f s −− −  
and  , rather than the relationship between  t s Δ 1 tt 1 f s − − −  and  t s Δ , per se.  Because of CIP, 
the correlation between   and 
*
1 tt ii − − 1 − 1 1 tt f s − − −  is always positive; therefore, the sign of 
β  depends on the sign of the correlation of 
*
1 tt ii 1 − − −  with  t s Δ , being negative when the 
correlation is negative and positive when the correlation is positive.  This illustrated in 
Figure 8, which plots the 30-month rolling correlation between 
*
1 tt ii 1 − − −  and  , and the 
corresponding 30-month rolling regression estimates of 
t s Δ
β  for the Italian lira.  The 
estimates of β  range from large negative values to large positive values, depending on 
whether the correlation between 
*
1 tt ii 1 − − −  and  t s Δ  is negative or positive.  The correlation 
between these two time series is 0.788, suggesting that much of the time variation in the 
estimates of β  is due to time variation in the correlation between 
*
1 tt ii 1 − − −  and  .  
Indeed, the signs of the correlation and estimates of 
t s Δ
β  are the same 94 percent of time 
(200 of 212 estimates). 
Table 4 presents the correlation between the 30-month rolling correlation of 
 and  , and the corresponding estimates of 
*
1 tt ii − − 1 − t s Δ β  and percent of time when the 
correlation and the estimate of β  had the same sign.  Table 4 also reports the 
corresponding significance levels for these statistics based on simulations under the 
assumption that ,  , and 
*
11 tt ii −− − t s Δ 1 tt 1 f s − − −  are independent.  The simulations use a 30-
month window and samples sizes identical to those that yield the results in Tables 3 and 4 
  19(see the appendix for details). The correlation between 
*
1 tt ii 1 − − −  and  t s Δ  accounts for 
much of the time variation in estimates of β  for eight of the nine currencies.  The 
exception is  , where the correlation is only 0.212, which is not significantly different 
from what could be obtained if there were no relationship among these variables.  Even 
for the  , however, the correlations and the estimates of 
CD
CD β  were the same sign for 76 
percent of the estimates and much larger than one would expect if 
*
1 tt ii 1 − − −  and   were 
unrelated.  For all of the other countries, the correlations are greater than 60 percent and 
the percent the same sign is 80 percent or higher.  Both are statistically significant at very 
low significances levels. 
t s Δ
The above analysis suggests that the forward premium puzzle is due to near-
random-walk behavior of exchange rates and the fact that  t s Δ  and  1 tt 1 f s − − −  are both 
correlated with  .  The strong positive correlation between 
*
1 tt ii −− − 1 1 1 tt f s − − −  and 
*
11 tt ii −− −  
is a consequence of CIP.  For most time periods and exchange rates the correlation 
between   and   is negative; however, during some periods it is positive.  A 
plausible explanation for the time variation in the relationship between   and   
is that the correlation is positive when the behavior of  
t s Δ
*




11 tt ii −− −
*
1 tt ii − − −  is due to changes in the 
relative real rates and negative when the behavior of 
*
1 tt ii 1 − − −  is due to the relative 
behavior of domestic/foreign expected inflation rates.  The latter dominates the former 
over longer sample periods for most countries.  Consequently, over longer sample periods 
and for most countries, the estimate of β  is negative.  This explanation is consistent with 
evidence from the late 1970s and early 1980s that the response of interest rates to surprise 
  20money announcements was due to changes in inflation rather than changes in real rates 
(e.g., Cornell, 1982, 1983; Engel and Frankel, 1984; Frenkel, 1981; and Thornton, 1989). 
Furthermore, given the relative magnitudes of the variances of   and the 
forward premium, estimates of 
t s Δ
β  from (15) can be very large—positive or negative.  
Because of the sensitivity of OLS to extreme observations, some of these estimates will 
be “statistically significant” in spite of the fact that the forward premium has little or no 
explanatory power for the change in the spot rate.   
6.2 Robustness Check 
The above evidence suggests that much of the failure of UIP is due to the near-
random-walk behavior of exchange rate (which is at odds with the rational expectations 
assumption used to derive the standard test for UIP), CIP and economic fundamentals.  If 
this explanation resolves the forward premium puzzle, it should be invariant to the 
sample period or to the particular pairs of exchange rates considered.  To investigate the 
robustness of the result to exchange rates and sample periods, the same analysis was 
undertaken using monthly data for the UK  spot and 3-month forward exchange rates 
with the U.S. dollar ($), the  , the  , and the 
P
FF DG IL for the period January 1921 
through December 1936.  These data are from Einzig (1937), a commonly used data 
source for testing UIP over this period.  Data for the U.S. and U.K. 3-month Treasury bill 
rates for the same period was obtained from Global Financial Data. 
Consistent with CIP, the correlation between 
*
3 tt ii 3 − − −  and  3 tt 3 f s − − −  is positive 
for the four currencies, although somewhat lower and more variable than those for the 
U.S. dollar over the 1979-2000 sample period.  Transactions and information costs are 
likely higher during this period, so that deviations from CIP are larger and more 
  21persistent.
13  Nevertheless, the results, summarized in Table 5, are similar to those 
obtained for the 1979-2000 period.  The top panel presents the full sample estimates of 
(15).  The estimates are typical of what is found in the literature.  For three of the four 
currencies, the estimate of β  is negative.  Moreover, estimates are significantly different 
from zero for the   and the  .  The  $ DG
2 R  is very small for the three European 
currencies, but is relatively large for the  .  $
The bottom panel summarizes the results over a 30-month rolling sample.  
Estimates of β  are unstable, ranging from large positive to large negative values.  
Moreover, as was the case for the U.S. dollar exchange rates over the 1979-2000 sample 
period, the correlation between 
*
3 tt ii 3 − − −  and  3 tt ss − −  accounts for much of the time 
variation in the estimates of β .  The correlation between these time series range from a 
low of about 0.50 for the IL to nearly 0.84 for the $.  The percent of the samples where 
the estimates of β  and the correlation were the same sign is very high, ranging from 75.5 
to 88.7 percent.  Moreover, with one exception these estimates are statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level.  The exception—the correlation for IL—is statistically significant 
at the 10 percent level. 
As a further check the analysis is applied to the U.S. dollar spot and 1-month 
forward exchange rates for 17 countries for the period January 2000 through December 
2006.  The exchange rates and the corresponding 1-month U.S. and foreign interest rates 
were obtained from Bloomberg.  These data are same-day exchange and interest rates for 
the last available observation in the corresponding month.  The results are summarized in 
Table 6.  While these data are not synchronous, the full sample correlations between 
                                                 
13 See Akram, Rime, and Sarno (2006) for data on the persistence of deviations from CIP in modern times. 
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1 tt ii − − 1 − 1  and  1 tt f s − − −
1
 are above 90 percent for all but two currencies and are above 97 
percent for twelve countries.  Moreover, the maximum and minimum 30-month rolling 
correlations suggest relatively little time variation for most currencies with many 
estimates close to 1.0.  These high correlations suggest that CIP is very close to holding 
for these data over much of the sample period.  The exception is the Taiwanese dollar 
where the correlations range from a high of 0.740 to a low of -0.743. 
In contrast, full-sample correlations between 
*
1 tt ii − − −  and  t s Δ  are negative for 
every country except Poland and maximum and minimum values of the 30-month rolling 
correlations indicate considerable time variation.  For all countries, the minimum 
correlation is negative and typically relatively large, while for all but two countries—
South Africa and Mexico—the maximum correlation is positive. 
Table 7 presents full sample estimates of β  for each currency along with the 
results from 30-month rolling correlations and regressions.  The full sample estimates of 
β  are negative except for the Taiwanese dollar and the Czech koruna.  The latter is 
consistent with resolution of the forward premium puzzle presented here in that the 
Czech Republic is the only country whose full sample correlation between   and 
 is positive.  Uncharacteristic of other sample periods, however, none of the estimates 
of 
*
1 tt ii − − 1 −
t s Δ
β  is statistically significantly at the 5 percent significance level and only two are 
significant at the 10 percent level.  Nevertheless, as before, estimates of β  are unstable, 
ranging from large negative to large positive values.  Moreover, the correlation between 
 and   accounts for much of the time variation in the estimates of 
*
1 tt ii − − 1 − t s Δ β , and all of 
the correlations except the Taiwanese dollar are statistically significant.  Furthermore, the 
  23percent of estimates where the sign of β  and the sign of the correlation between 
*
11 tt ii −− −  
and   are the same is greater than 85 percent for 14 of the 17 currencies and are 
statistically significant for every currency except the Taiwanese dollar. 
t s Δ
7. Conclusions 
There are two related puzzles in the empirical foreign exchange literature.  The 
first is the finding that there is a marked difference in the conclusion about the forward 
rate unbiasedness hypothesis depending on whether the hypothesis is tested using the 
forward rate or forward premium equation.  The second—the forward premium puzzle—
is the fact that the forward premium incorrectly predicts the direction of the subsequent 
change in the spot rate, which implies a massive rejection of UIP.  This paper resolves 
both puzzles. 
The first puzzle is resolved by showing that estimates of the slope parameter from 
the forward rate and forward premium equations are not comparable under the alternative 
hypothesis.  Since there are several reasons why unbiasedness will not hold exactly, there 
is no reason to be concerned that the estimates from these equations are different—
indeed, they are not comparable.  Simple Monte Carlo experiments show that the 
estimates from these equations will be very different even for tiny violations of the null 
hypothesis. 
The noncomparability of these parameters also means that, contrary to the 
suggestion in the literature that it is better to test unbiasedness using the forward premium 
rather than the forward rate specification, it is impossible to test unbiasedness using the 
forward premium specification.  This conclusion stems from the fact that it is impossible 
  24to obtain an estimate of the parameter under the alternative hypothesis that is comparable 
to the parameter under the null. 
The resolution of the forward premium puzzle stems from the observation that the 
stochastic perfect foresight assumption used to derive the forward premium test of UIP is 
greatly at odds with the near random walk behavior of exchange rates.  The near-random-
walk behavior of exchange rates implies a weak relationship between changes in the spot 
rate and the forward premium, which is consistent with estimates of the forward rate 
equation found in the literature.  CIP, however, implies that there is a strong positive 
correlation between the forward premium and the difference between domestic and 
foreign interest rates.  Hence, the sign of the estimate of the slope coefficient from the 
forward premium equation depends on the sign of the correlation between the change in 
the spot rate and the difference between domestic and foreign interest rates, being 
positive when this correlation is positive and negative when the correlation is negative.  
This resolution is supported by the fact that time variation in the correlation between the 
change in the spot rate and the difference between domestic and foreign interest rates 
explains much of the time variation in the estimates of the slope coefficient.  This is true 
for a variety of exchange rates and over several different sample periods.  The sign of this 
correlation is determined by economic fundamentals.  The correlation is positive when 
the behavior of the domestic/foreign interest rate differential is due to relative changes in 
real rates and negative when it is due to changes in expectations for inflation.  The 
forward premium puzzle—the preponderance of negative estimates of the slope 
coefficient—is because, for most exchange rates and for most sample periods, the 
  25difference between domestic and foreign interest rates reflects concerns about inflation 
rather than the behavior of real rates. 
Of course, the above explanation need not account for all of the anomalous results 
obtained using (15).  Other factors may also play a role.  As noted in Sections 3 and 4, 
minor violations of the unbiasedness condition can generate negative estimates of the 
slope coefficient as well.  Moreover, because exchange rates are not pure-random-walk 
processes, there may be some marginal predictability in the spot exchange rate beyond its 
current value (e.g., Clarida, Sarno, Taylor, and Valente, 2003).  Nevertheless, the results 
presented here suggest that the near-random-walk behavior of the spot rate, CIP, and 
economic fundamentals that generate correlation between the domestic/foreign interest 
differential and the change in the spot rates are important—if not the most important—
reasons for the empirical failure of UIP and, consequently, critical for resolving the 
forward premium puzzle. 
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  30Appendix 
 
 
This appendix outlines the procedure for testing whether the correlations between 
the rolling correlations between the change in the spot rate and the interest rate 
differential and percentages of estimates where the signs of the estimated correlations and 
the estimates of β  are the same are significantly different from what would have resulted 
had the series been independent.  Specifically, I estimate an AR(1) model of  ,  t s Δ
*
tt ii − , 
and  tt f s −  for each pair of countries and for each time period.  I then generate 10,000 
samples of the same size those used in the paper for each pair of currencies.  The samples 
are obtained by bootstrapping the residuals from the estimated models.  The residuals are 
sampled independently to guarantee independence.  For each variable the initial 
conditions were the last observation for that variable in the corresponding historical 
sample and 1,000 observations were generated before the samples were taken to 
minimize the effect of the initial conditions. 
An analysis identical to that in the text was then undertaken.  For each of the 
10,000 samples (15) was estimated using a 30-month rolling regression and the estimates 
of β  retained.
14  The 30-month rolling correlations of  t s Δ  and 
*
1 tt ii 1 − − −  for identical 
samples were also estimated.  The correlation between the 30-month rolling estimates of 
β  and correlation of   and  t s Δ
*
1 tt ii − 1 − −  were calculated for each of the 10,000 replications.  
These data were used to obtain distributions of both the correlations under the null 
hypothesis and the percent of the estimates where the correlation and the estimate of β  
have the same sign.   
                                                 
14 There were a couple of estimates for 17 exchange rates over the January 2000 – December 2006 period 
where the sample estimates of β  were slightly larger than 1.0.  In these cases,  β  was set to be 0.99. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
  CD  £  SF  ¥  BF IL FF  DG  DM 
  f 11 tt s − − −  
Mean  0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.002
Median 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.002
Max.  0.005 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.015 0.017 0.031 0.006 0.006 
Min.  -0.004 -0.007 -0.012 -0.010 -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 -0.010 -0.009
S.D.  0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 
  1 tt sf − −  
Mean  0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
Median  0.000  -0.001 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.004
Max.  0.032 0.107 0.089 0.086 0.079 0.097 0.079 0.079 0.079
Min.  -0.024 -0.109 -0.081 -0.104 -0.072 -0.069 -0.073 -0.071 -0.069
S.D.  0.011 0.028 0.032 0.031 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028
  t s Δ  
Mean  0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Median 0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 
Max.  0.033 0.102 0.090 0.081 0.081 0.112 0.089 0.081 0.081 
Min.  -0.024 -0.115 -0.084 -0.108 -0.072 -0.065 -0.072 -0.072 -0.072
S.D.  0.011 0.026 0.030 0.030 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 
Corr  0.989 0.997 0.994 0.997 0.996 0.993 0.992 0.996 0.995 






Table2: Estimate of Forward Premium Equation  
  CD  £  SF  ¥  BF IL FF  DG  DM 
α   0.002 -0.005  -0.004 -0.010 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002  -0.002
s.l.  0.005 0.004 0.107 0.001 .0471 0.744 0.522 0.272 0.385 
β   -1.132 -2.526 -1.395 -2.728 -0.824 0.448  0.023 -1.598 -0.894
s.l.  0.005 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.222 0.418 0.964 0.016 0.150 
2 R   0.025 0.045 0.018 0.047 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.005 
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Table 3: Correlation Between  11 * tt ii −− −  and  1 tt 1 f s − − − , and   for   t s Δ
Nine Exchange Rates 
  11 * tt ii −− −  and  11 tt f s − − −   11 * tt ii −− −  and    t s Δ
CD  0.857 -0.098 
£  0.905 -0.144 
SF  0.791 -0.156 
¥  0.489 -0.146 
BF  0.755 -0.103 
IL  0.632 0.003 
FF  0.670 -0.092 
DG  0.895 -0.117 
DM  0.892 -0.054 
 
 
Table 4: Correlation Between Rolling Estimates of β  and the 
Correlation of   and  11 * tt ii −− − t s Δ  and the Percent of Estimates of β  and 
the Correlation That Have the Same Sign 
 Correlation  s.l. Percent 
Same Sign  s.l. 
CD  0.218 0.221 0.757 0.008 
£  0.768 0.000 0.951 0.000 
SF  0.703 0.002 0.798 0.002 
¥  0.626 0.006 0.883 0.000 
BF  0.626 0.007 0.925 0.000 
IL  0.788 0.000 0.943 0.000 
FF  0.778 0.000 0.873 0.000 
DG  0.638 0.003 0.976 0.000 
DM  0.785 0.000 0.948 0.000 
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Table 5: Results for January 1921 – December 1936 
Currency  $  FF   DG   IL 
 Full-Sample  Regression  Results 
α   -1.004 0.010 -0.005 -0.005 
s.l.  0.318 0.195 0.171 0.401 
β   -6.395 -0.294 -0.975 0.253 
s.l.  0.000 0.524 0.036 0.438 
2 R   0.159 0.000 0.018 0.000 
  Rolling 30-Month Sample Results 
Max. β   6.871 5.599 2.905  15.535 
Mim. β   -40.875 -31.678 -26.646  -7.009 
  est, s.l. est, s.l. est, s.l. est, s.l. 
Correlation  0.836 0.000 0.629 0.022 0.491 0.079 0.698 0.006 




Table 6: 30-Month Rolling Correlations, January 2000 – December 2006 
 
*
1 tt ii − − 1 −  and  11 tt f s − − −  
*
1 tt ii − − 1 −  and  t s Δ  
  Full 
Sample  Max. Min..  Full 
Sample  Max. Min.. 
EURO  0.987 0.999 0.691 -0.163 0.156 -0.383 
Japan  0.988 0.995 0.871 -0.177 0.086 -0.377 
UK  0.989 0.998 0.921 -0.085 0.170 -0.272 
Canada  0.992 0.998 0.971 -0.114 0.181 -0.471 
Australia  0.973 0.994 0.817 -0.215 0.263 -0.393 
New  Zealand  0.939 0.988 0.320 -0.212 0.189 -0.421 
Switzerland  0.964 0.994 0.930 -0.123 0.117 -0.322 
Denmark  0.990 0.999 0.828 -0.146 0.165 -0.404 
Norway  0.992 0.999 0.923 -0.112 0.126 -0.395 
Sweden  0.990 0.999 0.838 -0.171 0.168 -0.473 
Singapore  0.987 0.998 0.910 -0.187 0.104 -0.344 
Hong  Kong  0.983 0.991 0.915 -0.178 0.054 -0.332 
Taiwan  0.332 0.740 -0.743 -0.031 0.561 -0.326 
Czech  Republic  0.979 0.998 0.929 -0.048 0.446 -0.280 
Poland  0.987 0.994 0.542 0.072 0.118 -0.386 
South  Africa  0.888 0.984 0.526 -0.251  -0.031  -0.564 
Mexico  0.966 0.969 0.817 -0.210  -0.139  -0.635 
 




Table 7: Summary of the Results of Monthly Data, January 2000 Through December 2006 
  Full-Sample Results  30-Month Rolling Window Results 
  β   s.l.  2 R   Max. β  Min.  β   Corr. s.l.  % Same 
Sign  s.l. 
EURO  -2.931 0.137 0.021  13.213  -54.212  0.470  0.200 96.296 0.004 
Japan  -2.494 0.108 0.029  13.027  -32.306  0.761  0.038 94.444 0.006 
UK  -1.151 0.292 0.003 8.530  -12.592  0.877  0.007 94.444 0.006 
Canada  -2.456 0.205 0.011 7.889  -16.068  0.950  0.001 88.889 0.021 
Australia  -3.530 0.105 0.030  15.197  -11.960  0.918  0.002 88.889 0.024 
New  Zealand  -2.834 0.147 0.019  16.265  -14.600  0.694  0.062 68.519 0.198 
Switzerland  -2.926 0.168 0.016  11.946  -42.603  0.781  0.030 92.593 0.012 
Denmark  -2.795 0.149 0.019  16.705  -32.146  0.749  0.046 96.296 0.005 
Norway  -1.439 0.206 0.011 2.754 -8.066 0.919  0.003 92.593 0.011 
Sweden  -2.578 0.130 0.023 9.477  -13.813  0.815  0.024 98.148 0.002 
Singapore  -0.379 0.112 0.028 0.057 -2.570 0.539  0.159 98.148 0.007 
Hong  Kong  -2.230 0.106 0.029 2.330  -16.703  0.852  0.011 96.296 0.005 
Taiwan  0.215 0.306 0.002 0.809 -2.232  -0.098 0.564 57.407 0.368 
Czech  Republic -0.502 0.340 0.001  79.424  -27.742  0.853  0.011 96.296 0.005 
Poland  0.722 0.254 0.006 3.468  -24.490  0.843  0.013 85.185 0.037 
South  Africa  -4.473 0.088 0.036 6.033  -12.089  0.921  0.001 62.963 0.277 





















Figure 1: The distributions of estimates of the slope coefficient from 
equations (4) and (5), respectively, under the null hypothesis that the 
forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the next-period spot rate, i.e.,  1 λ =
and 0 t θ = . 


















Figure 2: The distributions of estimates of the slope coefficient from 
equations (4) and (5), respectively, under the assumption that the 
forward rate is not an unbiased predictor of the next-period spot rate, 
i.e.,  1 λ = , and  0.001 θ σ = . 
 


















Figure 3: The distributions of estimates of the slope coefficient from 
equations (4) and (5), respectively, under the assumption of 
nonstationarity and under the null hypothesis that the forward rate is an 
unbiased predictor of the next-period spot rate, i.e.,  1 λ = , and  0 θ σ = . 
 

















Figure 4: The distributions of estimates of the slope coefficient from 
equations (4) and (5), respectively, under the assumption of 
nonstationarity and under the assumption that the forward rate is not an 
unbiased predictor of the next-period spot rate, i.e.,  1 λ = , and 
0.001 θ σ = . 
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Figure 5: Scatter Plots of  t s Δ  (vertical axis) and  1 t 1 f   t s − −  (horizontal axis)  −
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Figure 8: 30-Monthing Rolling Correlation Between (i-i*) and Δs
and Estimates of  β from the Forward Premium Equation
(Italian Lira) 
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